- Wednesday, February 10th 2021 at 16:00 - 17:00 UK (Other timezones)
- General participation info | Participate online | + Phone in Meeting ID: 972 4297 4350 Passcode: 205293 Find your local number: https://ucl.zoom.us/u/aedyEiW1A6
Anxiety disorders are characterized by a range of aberrations in the processing of and response to threat, but there is little consensus as to what core pathogenesis might underlie these symptoms. Here I propose a decision-theoretic account of anxiety wherein a particular unrealistically pessimistic assumption about the efficacy of future action can distort an agent’s behavior and underlie a host of seemingly disparate anxiety symptoms. I will show how this model makes a novel prediction about the value of free choice in anxious individuals and present data from a new experiment which shows, in line with our account, that the value of free choice is diminished in anxious individuals. Finally, I will conclude with a cautionary note about the risk of spurious correlations in online computational psychiatry experiments and the need for enhanced data quality screening.
PhD Candidate at the Princeton
Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University